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NOTES
Federal Tax Rulings:
I.

Procedure and Policy

INTRODUCTION

Although we have developed a highly sophisticated judicial mechanism
for ultimately resolving tax disputes, such a system fails to meet the needs of
the most industrialized nation on earth. A taxing statute of one quarter of a
million words cannot be complied with solely through the results of litigation.
Proper tax administration requires that the Service provide reliable and
timely information to aid taxpayers in interpreting this complex statute. 1

The rulings program of the Internal Revenue Service was designed
to meet the need for predictability of the tax consequences of any
given financial transaction. Though the rulings program is not particularly important to the average taxpayer, it has become increasingly
crucial both to the financial community 2 and to the Service itself. As

the tax laws become more complex, and tax risks become increasingly
important to the success of business ventures, the need for confirmation before entering into a transaction is intensified.3 Thus parties to
a transaction will generally request a ruling
whenever the answer is uncertain or when the transaction involves substantial sums of money, even when the uncertainty may not be very great.
In such circumstances the availability of a ruling in advance of the transaction has become almost as important as the financing or the know-how in4
volved.

This note will study the growth of the rulings program, the factors
which must be weighed by the tax practitioner before requesting a
ruling, and the amount of reliance which the taxpayer can safely
place upon the Service's interpretation of the law as applied to his
particular fact situation.
1. Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 Tx-s
756-57 (1965).
2. Redman, New Procedures Re Letter Rulings; Request for Washington Assistance,
15 U. So. CAL. 1963 TAx INsT. 411. "Perhaps the most popular phrase in many complicated ... business transactions is-'subject to favorable rulings of the Internal Revenue
Service.' There is barely a corporate merger, reorganization, or liquidation that rates
notice on the financial pages that does not include that phrase among the mountains
of paperwork that reflect the terms of the transaction."
3. Lore, Revision of Ruling Procedures Now Issued; "No Ruling" Areas Outlined, 18
J. TAxATION 114 (1963). "With rates as high as they are and the tax law as complex
as it is, clients frequently will not move without a specific ruling where one can be
obtained. The consequences of an adverse stand by the Service are frequently so
horrendous as to rule out many business transactions unless official assurances are given
as to the tax consequences."
4. Redman, supranote 2, at 413.
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II. DEFINITIONS

Before beginning a discussion of "rulings," it is necessary to define
the exact types of communication embodied by that term-the "letter
ruling" and the "Revenue Ruling"-and to compare them to other
forms of communication between the Internal Revenue Service and
the taxpayer.
"A 'ruling' is a written statement issued to a taxpayer

. .

by the

National Office which interprets and applies the tax laws to a specific
state of facts."5 This is an expression of an official interpretation by
the Commissioner, and may not be given orally by anyone employed
by the Service. 6 Rulings are applicable both to prospective transactions and to completed transactions for which a return has not yet
been filed;7 they "serve the purpose of establishing principles and
procedures of the Service in the interpretation and application of
8
substantive tax law."

In contrast to a ruling:
[a] 'determination letter' is a written statement issued by a District Director

in response to an inquiry... which applies to the particular facts involved
the principles and precedents previously announced by the National

Office. Determination letters are issued only where a determination can be
made on the basis of clearly established rules as set forth in the statutes,
Treasury Decisions or regulations, or by rulings, opinions, or court decisions
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. 9

The determination letter generally applies only to completed transactions'" and appears more limited in scope than the ruling, since the
District Director is restricted to determinations based upon "clearly
established" rules." Thus, the National Office, in its rulings, "makes"
law, while the District Director is limited to applying that law to
the facts according to the sharply defined patterns established by the
superior branch. This seems a wise limitation since the various District
Directors, if allowed total freedom to interpret the tax laws as they
saw fit, might destroy the uniformity so necessary to the national tax
structure.
5. Rev. Proc. 28, § 2.02, 1962-2 Cumf. BOLL. 496, 497.

6. Marshall, Recent Developments in Ruling Procedures: The New Two-Part Procedure; Requests for Technical Advice, N.Y.U. 24TH LsT. oN FED. TAx. 83 (1966).
7. Redman, supra note 2, at 417.
8. Marshall, supra note 6, at 84.
9. Rev. Proc. 28, § 2.03, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 497.
10. Redman, supranote 2, at 418.
11. "Where such a determination cannot be made, e.g. where the question presented
involves a novel issue, a determination letter will not be issued by a District Director.
A determination letter . . . is similar to a ruling in that it is an interpretaton of facts
submitted by the taxpayer. It differs in that it does not normally venture into untried
issues." Marshall, supra note 6, at 84.
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An 'information letter' is a statement issued either by the National Office
or by a District Director which does no more than call attention to a well
established interpretation or principle of tax law, without applying it to a
12
specific set of facts.

The information letter is usually extremely general in nature, and
does not give a solution based on the application of the law to specific

facts.13 Its primary purpose is to impart general knowledge which the
Service feels will be of assistance to taxpayers requesting information.14

"A 'Revenue Ruling' is an official interpretation by the Service
which has been published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin . . . for

the information and guidance of taxpayers, Internal Revenue Service

officials, and others concerned."' 5 Published rulings concern questions
which the National Office considers important both to taxpayers and
Service officials, and are generally derived from letter rulings, de-

termination letters, and requests for technical advice. 16 The Service

takes the position that if the taxpayer's factual situation is "substantially the same" as that proposed in the Revenue Ruling, he may
consummate his transaction without requesting a letter ruling; how-

ever, practitioners feel that the wiser course is to obtain a letter
ruling whenever there is uncertainty about the outcome. 18

Two additional devices, the "closing agreement" 9 and the request
for "technical advice,"20 are employed in taxpayer-Service relations.
The closing agreement is a method, authorized by statute,2 ' by which
the taxpayer's ruling becomes final and conclusive upon both the
taxpayer and the Service, in the absence of fraud, malfeasance or
misrepresentation of material facts. This procedure seems highly

desirable, since the Service is not actually bound by its rulings; but
12. Rev. Proc. 28, § 2.04, 1962-2 Ctum. BULL. 497.
13. Ellentuck, How and When to Use the Advance Ruling, 21 J. TAXAnoN 52 (1964).
14. Rogovin, supra note 1, at 771 n.79, points out that in 1964 the National Oflice
answered over 32,000 general information requests.
15. Rev. Proc. 28, § 2.05, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 497.
16. Redman, supra note 2, at 418.
17. Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A Statement of
Principles, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1, 18 (1962). Caplin goes on to caution
the taxpayer to give "careful consideration . . . to subsequent legislation and subsequently published rulings, regulations and court decisions, for any one of them may
change the results of the original published position."
18. Taylor, Tax Rulings: New Rules and Procedures, N.Y.U. 21sT INST. ON FED. TAX.
69,91 (1963).
19. Rev. Proc. 28, § 2.06, 1962-2 Ctms. BuLL. 497. "A 'closing agreement' . . . is
an agreement between the Commissioner . . . and a taxpayer with respect to a specific
issue or issues entered into pursuant to the authority contained in section 7121 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Such a closing agreement is based on a ruling which
has been signed by the Commissioner .

. .

. Closing agreements are final and con-

clusive .... "
20. Rev. Proc. 29, § 2.01, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 507.
21. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7121.
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the complex and cumbersome procedures involved in obtaining an
agreement, and the fact that the Service will generally limit revocation of rulings to prospective effect 2 2 reduce its use greatly. "This is
evidenced by the fact that in fiscal 1964 the IRS received requests for
only four closing agreements as compared with 40,000 requests for
rulings." 3S
'Technical advice' .. . means advice or guidance as to the interpretation
and proper application of internal revenue laws . . . and regulations, to a
specific set of facts, furnished by the National Office upon request of a
district office in connection with the examination or consideration of a
24
taxpayer's return or claim for refund or credit.

This device is used by the National Office to aid the district offices in
closing cases, and to help maintain a uniform approach to similar
tax problems throughout the various districts.
Of the various forms of communication, the private ruling is the
most significant to the taxpayer who desires advance assurance of
the tax consequences of a proposed transaction. The closing agreement, though attractive in its finality, is too slow and would be of
little value if a relatively quick determination is needed. The information letter is too general to aid in determining the specific tax
results which will flow from given facts, and the determination letter,
though often useful, will generally not issue in response to a novel tax
question which requires interpretation. Though the Revenue Ruling
is often helpful, there are hidden dangers if the taxpayer's factual
situation is not "substantially the same," or if the Ruling is later
superseded and the taxpayer consummates a transaction without this
knowledge. Thus, the wise course demands an individual ruling which
interprets the law according to the taxpayer's specific factual situation.
III. HISTORY OF TE RULINGs PROGRAM
Under the original Revenue Act of 1913, 5 the policy of the Service
was to answer all questions, 26 whether related to proposed or consummated transactions. These answers were considered purely advisory,
and the Service could change its mind without warning, even though
the taxpayer had relied upon its opinion.- In 1919, however, the
Service began to restrict its rulings to completed transactions, except
Caplin, supra note 17, at 21.
Rogovin, supra note 1, at 770.
Rev. Proc. 29, § 2.01, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 507.
38 Stat. 66.
Houser, Current Problems in the Office of the Chief Counsel, TULANE 12TH TAx
INST. 1, 3 (1963).
27. Caplin, supra note 17, at 3.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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in those areas in which rulings were commanded by statute before a
proposed transaction might be closed.28
This restrictive policy was continued through 1937, when taxpayer
concern over the lack of reliable advice resulted in legislation which
authorized the Commissioner to enter into formal closing agreements
with regard to proposed transactions. It soon became obvious that
the closing agreement was too formal and cumbersome to handle
the number of requests submitted, and this method was recognized
as unsatisfactory both to the taxpayer and to the Service. 29 In answer
to this problem, the Service began to treat each request for a ruling
concerning the tax consequences of a proposed transaction as a
potential request for a closing agreement, and responded to these
requests with letter rulings. This policy was formally publicized by
the Service in 1953, in Revenue Ruling 10. 30
In 1954, through Revenue Ruling 54-172, the Service clearly
stated that its policy would be
to answer inquiries of individuals and organizations, whenever appropriate
in the interest of sound tax administration, as to their status for tax purposes

and as to the tax effects of their acts or transactions, prior to their filing of

returns ....

31

The ruling went on to point out that taxpayers who relied upon

rulings would generally be protected from retroactive change32 -a
clear shift from the prior practice of regarding rulings as mere
advisory opinions.33 Ruling 54-172 has been supplemented on several
occasions, but it still is a valid statement of the Service's position
that rulings are purely a matter of discretion, 34 and that in numerous
instances they will not be granted.3 5
A. The No-Ruling List
The rulings program grew as an answer to the consistent taxpayer
plea for a convenient method of obtaining advance assurance in tax
questions. This growth, if taken to its logical extreme, would lead
to a policy of answering any and all questions, whether based on
hypothetical or actual facts, whether attempting to solve a serious
business problem or attempting to use the Service's information to
establish a tax avoidance scheme. Furthermore, if the Service serf28. Memo 2228, § 1309, 1 Ctm. BuLL. 310 (1919). This type of provision-requir§ 367.

ing prior rulings-appears in INT. REV. CODE of 1954,

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Rogovin, supranote 1, at 763.
1953-1 Cum. BuLL. 488; Redman, supra note 2, at 424.
Rev. Rul. 172, § 2.01, 1954-1 Cum. BurLL. 395.
Rev. Rul. 172, § 12.05, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 401.
Caplin, supra note 17, at 6.
Rev. Ru. 172, § 5.01, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 398.
Rev. Rul. 172, § 6, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 398.
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ously attempted to answer all questions presented to it, it is doubtful
whether any would be answered within sufficient time to be useful to
the taxpayer. Thus, the policy favoring easily accessible advance
advice was balanced against the administrative feasibility of attempting to rule upon every request submitted.3 6 The scope of the rulings

program was limited by excluding certain questions, first under the
discretionary power of the Commissioner and later through the

published "no-ruling" lists.
Revenue Ruling 54-172 indicated that the Commissioner retained

a large degree of discretion,3 and that rulings generally would not
be issued in response to questions primarily factual in nature. 38 This

classification was not completely satisfactory, however, since the
guidelines established were rather vague, and since it is always

difficult to determine whether a particular problem constitutes a
question of fact. Taxpayers continued to request rulings and the

Service continued to reject the questions, causing a waste of time,
effort, and money to the Service and to taxpayers.
Realizing that these vague guidelines would continue to result
in fruitless attempts to gain rulings in areas upon which the Service

would not rule, the Commissioner, in 1960, published a list of specific
areas in which rulings would never be given, and those in which
rulings would not ordinarily be given. 39 In Revenue Procedure 60-6,
the Commissioner set forth twenty-seven specific and three general
areas in which the Service would not rule. The twenty-seven specific

questions were characterized as "factual in nature,"40 while the general

36. The Service presently handles 30,000 to 40,000 ruling requests each year. See
Caplin, supra note 17, at 9; Rose, The Rulings Program of the Internal Revenue Service,
35 TAXEs 907 (1957).
37. Rev. Rul. 172, § 5.01, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL. 398. "[T]he Internal Revenue Service
has discretionary authority to issue determination letters or rulings ....
That discretion
will be exercised in the light of all relevant circumstances, including the business or
other reasons motivating the transaction, and . . . only to the extent consistent with a
wise administration of the revenue system."
38. Rev. Rul. 172, § 6, 1954-1 Cum. BuLL.. 398. "In addition to the other situations
described herein, rulings or determination letters ordinarily will not be issued in
connection with income, profits, estate, and gift tax matters where the determination
requested is primarily one of fact, e.g., (1) market value of property, (2) whether
compensation is reasonable in amount, (3) whether a transfer is one in contemplation
of death, (4) whether retention of earnings and profits by a corporation is for the
purpose of avoiding surtax on its shareholders, or (5) whether a transfer or acquisition
is within section 15(c) or section 129 of the... Code."
39. Caplin, supra note 17, at 14. "In issuing Revenue Procedure 60-6, the Service
was striving for clearer and fairer administration of the ruling process. Essentially, it
sought to save taxpayers and tax practitioners time, trouble and frustration in developing and submitting requests for rulings, only to be advised that the Service could notrule on the question presented." Id. at 15.
40. Rev. Proc. 6, § 3.01, 1960-1 Cum. BuL. 881-84. Typical questions upon which
the Service will not rule include: (1) Whether an amount paid to an employee is gift
or compensation. (4) Whether compensation is reasonable in amount. (5) Whether
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areas seemed to be subjects upon which the Service would not wish
to rule for its own protection or for administrative reasons. 41 In addition, Revenue Procedure 60-6 stated five specific questions and one
general area, also essentially factual in nature, in which the Service
would not ordinarily rule.
Revised listings were published in 196242 and 1964, 43 and in each
list the scope of prohibition was narrowed. Revenue Procedure 64-31
has significantly narrowed the "no-ruling" list by removing from the
prohibited area such questions as:
(1) Whether an amount paid by an employer to an employee
under specific factual circumstances is a gift, or compensation.
(2) Whether a corporation has earnings and profits available for
distribution to its shareholders.
(3) Whether the retention of earnings and profits by a corporation is for the purpose of avoiding surtax on its shareholders."
Some commentary 45 has suggested that Revenue Procedure 64-31 will
be of only limited value to taxpayers since
as Rev. Proc. 64-31 so carefully points out, the elimination of items previously described in Rev. Proc. 62-32 should not be construed as meaning
the Service will rule on these items, but merely that the Service will consider
such requests and may decline to rule in advance on any question . . .4
advances to thin corporations are loans or equity capital. (7) Whether an acquisition
is within the meaning of § 269. (10) A determination of earnings and profits of a
corporation which are available for dividends. (13) Whether a corporation is
"collapsible." (20) Whether retention of earnings and profits by a corporation is for
the purpose of avoiding surtax on its shareholders.
41. Rev. Proc. 6, § 3.02, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 884. These general areas include:
"1. The results of transactions which lack bona fide business purpose and have as their
principal purpose the reduction of Federal taxes. 2. A matter upon which a court
decision adverse to the Commissioner has been handed down and the question of
following the decision or litigating further has not yet been resolved. 3. A matter
involving the prospective application of the estate tax to the property or the estate of a
living person."
42. Rev. Proc. 32, 1962-2 Ctmr. BULL. 527. Though this list contains 26 specific
no-ruling areas with 37 specific questions, some of the previous no-ruling questions were
shifted to the "not ordinarily" list. For example, the question of whether a corporation
is "collapsible" within the meaning of § 341 was shifted to the category of questions in
which rulings will not ordinarily be issued in 1962.
43. Rev. Proc. 31, 1964-2 Cum. Buxr . 947.
44. In addition to the questions mentioned in text, Rev. Proc. 64-31 removes such
questions as: (1) whether stockholders who waive their rights to future dividends for
a specified period of time will be in receipt of income should the corporation subsequently declare and pay a dividend during the waiver period; (2) determination of the
year of taxability of amounts realized pursuant to arrangement, designed to defer the
time of receipt to a date later than that upon which the right becomes vested.
45. 21 J. TAXATION 156 (1964).
46. Id. This comment further points out that "[T]he practitioner must still rely upon
informal chats with Treasury officials and must be certain that he will obtain a favor-
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This caveat is true in any ruling situation, since the Commissioner
always retains discretion to refuse to rule; and the warning is no more
applicable to this particular example, i.e., deletions from the no-ruling
list, than to the entire ruling area. The entire concept of rulings is
based on the good faith desire of the Commissioner to enable the
taxpayer to obtain advance information, and there is no reason to
suspect that he would remove items from the prohibited list if he
knew in advance that no rulings would be issued. The majority of
commentators seem to agree that Revenue Procedure 64-31 "represents a movement toward the principles of ruling whenever feasible." 47
B. Effect of "No-Ruling"
Although the no-ruling lists were instituted to save taxpayers time
and money, it is possible that they have taken on the character of
indirect economic controls, due to the adverse effects which the
addition of an item to the no-ruling list may have on proposed transactions. This economic control has been illustrated by several commentators in discussions of the Warwick Fund, and its demise after a
refusal to rule upon its tax consequences. 48 The Warwick Fund was
a "swap-fund" which was to have been organized in partnership
form so as to avoid the no-ruling policy which was already in
force with respect to corporate funds. A favorable private ruling was
obtained by the Fund, but this ruling was quickly revoked. 49 The
Service did not rule adversely to the plan; it merely refused to rule
at all, 50 thus chilling any plans for continuation of the project 5 ' due
to the "contemplated difficulty of convincing a sufficient number of
individuals holding highly appreciated stocks to subscribe [to the
Fund] without the final assurance of the Commissioner that this would
not be a taxable exchange."52 Thus, the power to refuse to act gives
able ruling before he can consider requesting a ruling." Id. at 157. This statement raises
serious questions as to the effect of this private rule-making on the concept of equal
treatment for all taxpayers.
47. Note, The Availability and Reviewability of Rulings of the Internal Revenue
Service, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 81, 93 (1964).
48. See Goldman, Warwick Fund Ruling Withdrawn; IRS Policy Questioned, 19 J_
TAxATioN 197 (1963); Note, supra note 47, at 84-86.
49. Goldman, supra note 48, at 197.
50. This refusal to rule was published in Rev. Proc. 63-20, 1963-2 Cum. BULL. 754,
and incorporated in Rev. Proc. 64-31, § 3.07, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL. 950.
51. "The promoters of the Warwick Fund upon notice of the revocation abandoned
their venture, either out of fear or general conservatism." Goldman, supra note 48, at
198.
52. Note, supra note 47, at 85. The Commissioner has pointed out that the mereaddition of an item to the no-ruling list is not to be construed as "necessarily reflecting
a hostile attitude towards the transaction." (emphasis added). Caplin, supra note 17,
at 15. It is difficult to comprehend the Commissioner's statement in view of the realities
of the situation. If a specific transaction is added to the no-ruling list, it will alwaya
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the Commissioner a key influence upon the success or failure of
economic ventures, even though the plan in question is arguably
within the express language of the Code. It is this "propriety of
refusing to rule when the Service could not, in good conscience,
rule unfavorably" 53 which has been questioned by the tax bar in
situations such as the Warwick Fund.
The Commissioner explains the no-ruling policy by pointing out
that
[c]ertain plans have tax attractiveness if a narrow reading of a Code provi-

sion is assumed. In fact, the correct tax interpretation may be uncertain or
borderline in light of the total legislative history. Others may appear to be
designed solely, or at least primarily, for tax avoidance purposes-or fall
into the category of what is commonly called a 'tax gimmick.' In these situations where the correct tax result is in doubt, it does not appear to be 'wise
administration' for the Service to give its official blessing by issuing a
favorable advance ruling.54

The Commissioner's argument is valid, but it fails to meet the argument against which it is directed. No one could seriously expect
the Commissioner to bless a tax gimmick with a favorable ruling, but
this does not mean that the Commissioner should do nothing at all.
If the Commissioner feels that only a narrow reading of a particular
provision would result in a favorable ruling, he should feel free to
issue an unfavorable response, and to explain to the taxpayer exactly
why this response was issued. If, on the other hand, the Commissioner
feels that the transaction, as presented, is a borderline situation, upon
which he does not wish to commit the Service, he might refuse to
rule, but at the same time present the taxpayer with a statement of
the problems which have caused his hesitancy to rule.5 The disclosure
of the reasons behind the Commissioner's acts would serve to decrease
the confusion and uncertainty resulting from an unarticulated refusal,
and would increase public confidence in the Commissioner. Also, the
taxpayer might be able to reorganize his transaction so as to overcome
the problems suggested by the Commissioner rather than being
left in a state of total ignorance and indecision. There is no doubt
that such a solution to the no-ruling problem would increase the
administrative workload of the Service, but the overall policy of the
rulings program would receive great support. Hopefully, the recent
trend toward narrowing the no-ruling areas will continue, and the
Commissioner will further the policy of advance guidance (whether
by favorable or adverse ruling) whenever possible.
be construed, and probably accurately, as subject to hostility from the Service, because
the Commissioner has expressly refused to grant a favorable ruling in the matter.
53. Goldman, supra note 48, at 198.
54. Caplin, supra note 17, at 16.
55. Note, supra note 47, at 93-94.
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IV. PRATCAL CONSIDERATIONS IN OBTAINING A RULING

Clearly a practice which affords advance information concerning
the tax consequences of a proposed transaction is quite advantageous
to the taxpayer. 56 Indeed, it has been recognized by Mortimer Caplin
(then Commissioner of Internal Revenue) that the present rulings

policy is most helpful to the Service as well. Mr. Caplin points out
that the present policy provides:
(1) Uniformity in the application of the laws and regulations . .. through
centralized interpretation.
(2) [F]air and economical tax administration ....
(3) [V]aluable information to the Service by advising it in advance of audit
of transactions being consummated or conor litigation, on the kinds
57
sidered by taxpayers.

The advantages of such a program apply to taxpayers as a group;

but before the individual taxpayer decides to obtain a ruling, there
are numerous other factors to be considered. In essence, the taxpayer

must balance "the desirability of obtaining a high degree of tax
certainty against the time and expense involved in obtaining a ruling
and against the consequences of obtaining an adverse ruling or
no ruling at all."5m This broad statement must be sub-divided before

it can provide meaningful guidance to the tax practitioner faced with
the problem of obtaining a ruling.
A. Is a Favorable Ruling Likely To Be Obtained?
A tax practitioner should not request a ruling if he is not fairly

optimistic about the Service's potential response to his request. Thus,
he must attempt to ascertain the basic position of the Service with

regard to the type of transaction in question before he ever asks for
the ruling. One method by which this may be accomplished is the
so-called "telephone practice," whereby tax practitioners call individuals in the National Office and determine the Service's position on a
56. Caplin, supra note 17, at 7. "Taxpayer advantages include: (1) A measure of
certainty is provided that assists them in deciding whether to consummate contemplated:
transactions. (2) Advance advice on the Service's position serves to minimize futurecontroversy and tax litigation. (3) Rulings make it easier to determine taxes correctlyand promote voluntary compliance." Id. Mr. Caplin points out that the thirdadvantage applies equally to the Service.
57. Id.
58. Clark, Practical Considerations in Obtaining Rulings and in Filing Claims for
Refund, TuLANE 6mT TAX INsT. 257, 268 (1957). Ellentuck, supra note 13, at 53,
explains the problem in terms of cost: "The first step in deciding whether to request
a ruling is to make an estimate of (1) the cost of obtaining the ruling ... and (2) the
amount of 'tax dollars' at issue. Clearly, if the estimated cost of the ruling exceeds the
maximum deficiency that could be assessed against the transaction, a ruling should not
be requested."
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particular issue without the need for a formal request.59 In addition,
the practitioner must consider the language of the Code sections
involved and the general policy against ruling on any transaction
which seems to lack a bona fide business purpose. 60 If the Code
language indicates a restrictive policy, or if the transaction is subject
to an interpretation which points towards tax motivation as a primary
purpose, there will be little chance that the Service will rule formally."'
B. Time Factor
If time is of the essence to the success of the transaction, it is best
to act without the assurance of a ruling. 62 Although the average ruling
request (65%) takes approximately sixty days, 63 this average is of no
value to the individual taxpayer with a complex problem, as his
request may take three months or longer to process.6 4 If the taxpayer
is forced to make a binding decision within two months of the request,
it is probably unwise to request a ruling.
C. Possibility of Raising CollateralIssues
In every ruling request there is a possibility that the submission of
facts to the Commissioner will raise additional issues which the taxpayer would rather avoid at that time. 65 As one commentator points
out, the request for a ruling always places the tax practitioner
in the extraordinary position of seeking a judicial response from an opposing
litigant. This fact has certain significant consequences; it means that counsel
must always take into account the dangers of (1) disclosing unnecessary facts
to this adversary and (2) calling the attention of the latter's investigative and
66
auditing arm to this particular transaction.

Thus the request for ruling on one transaction may result in audit
or litigation on a tangential problem which was not clearly brought to
the tax advisor's attention.
D. Nature of the Transaction
If the transaction is established in such an inflexible form that it
cannot be changed if an unfavorable ruling is returned, and the tax59. Yager, When and How Should the Practitioner Ask for Rulings and Technical
Advice, 14 J. TAxATioN 38 (1961). See quote, supra note 46 for additional evidence
indicating the wide-spread use of "telephone practice."
60. Clark, supranote 58, at 272-73.
61. Id.
62. Marshall, supra note 6, at 93-94.
63. Ellentuck, How and When to Use the Advance Ruling, 21 J. TAXATION 52, 55
(1964).
64. Taylor, supranote 18, at 72.
65. Marshall, supra note 6, at 94.
66. Clark, supra note 58, at 269-70.
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payer is not confident that the reply will be favorable, it might be
best to undertake the transaction without requesting a ruling. If
the taxpayer receives an adverse ruling, and consummates the transaction despite it, he can be positive that the district office will take an
adverse position since "the field almost always follows the conclusions
of the National Ofce ...."67
It is also somewhat unwise to request a ruling on a consummated
transaction. The facts upon which tax liability will be based have
already been irrevocably established, and if an unfavorable ruling
were then issued, the taxpayer would be hard-pressed indeed in trying
to change the mind of a District Director armed with an adverse
6
opinion from the National Office.
It is best not to request a ruling in a transaction which is frowned
upon by the Service but acceptable to the courts. Here it might be
wise to take the calculated risk of litigation and proceed, rather than
to evoke an immediate negative response from the Service. 69
Assuming, however, that the tax practitioner errs, and submits a
ruling request, what alternatives will be open to him, or to the
Service?
1. Withdrawal of Ruling Requests.-The taxpayer has the right to
withdraw a ruling request until the ruling letter is signed at the
National Office.
However, in such a case, the National Office may furnish its views to the
District Director in whose office the return . . .will be filed. The District
Director will consider the information submitted in a subsequent audit or
examination . . .7

Thus, the withdrawal, although motivated by fear of an unfavorable
ruling, may be ineffectual. This problem is indicative of the need
for extreme care on the part of the practitioner before submitting
71
the request for advice.
2. Receipt of an Adverse Ruling.-Some commentators suggest that
the receipt of an adverse ruling is not a major disaster, since it allows
the taxpayer to mold his transaction to meet the objections of the
Service. 7 2 If, however, the transaction is inflexible, the taxpayer must
67. Ellentuck, supra note 63, at 55.
68. Yager, supra note 59, at 38.
69. Marshall, supra note 6, at 94.
70. Rev. Proc. 28, § 11, 1962-2 Cum.BULL. 504.
71. But note that Yager, supra note 59, at 41-42, points out that the danger of
withdrawal is overstated, arguing that "the national office rarely takes such action unless
it has reason to believe that the transaction has already been consummated or will takeplace in essentially the same form in which it has been considered by the national
office."
72. Id. at 38.
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either abandon it, consummate it and pay the additional taxes, or
litigate. The District Office will not be amenable to compromise on
the results of the transaction since it will follow the already stated
position of the National Office.
3. Refusal To Rule.-Other than the feeling of uncertainty which is
created by a refusal to rule, the taxpayer is in no worse position than
if he had withdrawn his request. If the Commissioner believes that
the transaction has been or will be consummated in the same form as
suggested in the request, he will send the information to the District
Office.73
In each of the three situations above, it is clear that no result of an
unwise request will materially benefit the taxpayer, and the tax
practitioner must carefully analyze each possible result before submitting the ruling request.
V.

RELIANCE AND

VOCATION

A. The Service's View

Ordinarily the published Revenue Ruling will not be revoked
retroactively, and the taxpayer may rely upon it if his factual
situation is substantially the same as that stated in the published
ruling.74 Generally the problems in this area are caused by reliance
upon Revenue Rulings which have since been modified or superseded
by later rulings, regulations or legislation. The problem of greater
difficulty is the amount of reliance which the taxpayer may safely
place on a letter ruling. The Commissioner holds, as a matter of
law, that no private ruling is binding, and that he is free to revoke
retroactively if rulings are later determined to be contrary to the law.75
Revenue Procedure 62-28 indicates that in practice, rulings will be
retroactively revoked in relatively few situations if the taxpayer can
meet the following conditions:
(1) there has been no misstatement or omission of material facts,

(2) the facts subsequently developed are not materially different from the
facts on which the ruling was based,
73. Clark, supra note 58, at 279.
74. Rev. Proc. 28, §§ 13.09-.10, 1962-2 Ctrm. BuLL. 506.
75. The Commissioner holds that § 7805(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
gives him discretion to limit individual rulings to prospective effect, but does not give
him the power to announce a firm policy against retroactive revocation in every
situation. Caplin, supra note 17, at 21. Section 7805(b) provides: "Retroactivity of
Regulations or Rulings-The Secretary or his delegate may prescribe the extent, if any,
to which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied
without retroactive effect." The Commissioner's reading of this provision might be
unduly restrictive, brought about by other practical considerations rather than a desire
to follow explicitly the will of Congress.
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(3) there has been no change in the applicable law,
(4) the ruling was originally issued with respect to a prospective or proposed
transaction, and
(5) the taxpayer directly involved in the ruling acted in good faith in reliance upon the ruling and the retroactive revocation would be to his
76
detriment.

Although it may seem difficult to gain protection through satisfaction
of these five conditions, it is probable that in the average ruling
situation in which the practitioner has acted with care, the taxpayer
will be in a position to bind the Service, under its own policy, to a
prospective revocation. The Service desires to honor its word, and
takes great pains to point out that it is a rare case indeed in which
the taxpayer, acting in good faith, has suffered a retroactive revoca77
tion.
In all probability, the Commissioner's allowance in practice of that
which he refuses to allow as a matter of law reflects a simple compromise position between the extremes of no rulings at all and
binding rulings in every instance. The Commissioner recognizes the
advantages of rulings, but he cannot afford to bind the Service to
improper positions, and must maintain maximum flexibility at all
times. However, if the Service becomes too flexible, and changes its
mind too often, the taxpayer will soon lose faith. Thus the Service
must attempt to maintain a policy of fair play to the taxpayer when
establishing ruling procedures. This policy of fair play may have
received great impetus from the case of James Couzens.7 8 Couzens
was an early investor in Ford Motors, owning some 2,180 shares of
stock. In 1919, Henry and Edsel Ford desired to buy out the minority
interests. However, these interests would not sell until they obtained
a valuation on their stock, so as to determine the tax consequences
of the sale. The Service estimated a value of $9,489.34 per share as of
March 1, 1913, and Couzens then sold out for $13,444.43 per share,
including $8,622,096.70 as profit in the following year's return. In
1925, the Commissioner revalued the stock as of March 1, 1913, at a
price of $2,634 per share, and assessed a deficiency of over ten
million dollars against Couzens. The Board of Tax Appeals refused
to accept Couzens' argument that the Commissioner was estopped
by his earlier ruling. The Board stated that the Commissioner was
in no way bound by prior opinions. 79 A case of this nature would be
highly publicized in financial circles, and might tend to destroy
public confidence in the Service. Since this case, the Service has
76. Rev. Proc. 28, § 13.05, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 505.
77. Caplin, supra note 17, at 21; Taylor, supra note 18, at 87.
78. 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
79. Id. at 1159. However, the Board revalued Couzens' stock at $10,000 per share,
affording him a refund rather than a deficiency. Id. at 1172.
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moved steadily in the direction of honoring its opinions, 80 and the
good faith taxpayer is normally safe in relying upon his own letter

ruling.
B. The Courts View
Though the Commissioner normally refrains from a retroactive
revocation, the possibility of such an unfortunate occurrence cannot

be entirely dismissed. What remedies are available at law for the
taxpayer who has relied upon a private ruling, only to have it revoked

retroactively and followed by a deficiency letter? The courts, in
dealing with this problem have recognized, at least in principle, that

the Commissioner may abuse the discretion granted him under section
7805(b) of the Internal Revenue 82Code,8 ' and that this question is a
proper subject of judicial review.
In Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner,83 the Supreme
Court made it quite clear that the Commissioner may abuse his discretion in certain retroactive revocation situations. The Commissioner

had granted the taxpayer exemption rulings in 1934 and 1938, which

relieved the taxpayer of income taxes as a "club." 84 In 1945, the Commissisoner revoked these rulings, and retroactively applied taxes to
the years 1944 and 1943. The taxpayer admitted liability for 1945
and all future years, but argued that the Commissioner should not

be allowed to levy taxes for the two previous years. After pointing
out that the doctrine of estoppel could not be used to bar the Commissioner from correcting a mistake of law, 85 the Court clearly indicated that, while the Commissioner could be guilty of an abuse of

discretion, 6 there was no abuse in this case because the Commissioner

treated the taxpayer in exactly the same fashion as all other taxpayers
in the same situation. 87 This case is important not because of its
80. Wenchel, Taxpayers' Rulings, 5 TAx L. REv. 105, 111-13 (1949).
81. For a complete discussion of all the methods by which the courts have tried to
restrain incidents of taxpayer abuse, see Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of
Discretion as Applied Against the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAx
L. Pmv.487 (1964). See also Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S.
180, 185 (1957); Lesavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956).
82. Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
83. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
84. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 101(9), 53 Stat. 33:

"The following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter(9) Clubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other
nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
(private) shareholder... "
85. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957).
86. "The Commissioner's action may not be disturbed unless, in the circumstances
of this case, the Commissioner abused the discretion vested in him by § 3791(b) of the
1939 Code." (Now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7805(b) ). Id. at 184.

87. Id. at 186. It would appear that if an abuse of discretion had been found in this
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narrow holding, but because the Court indicated that the Commissioner might be barred from collecting back taxes based on retroactive
revocations if an abuse of discretion were found.
Other than noting that all taxpayers were treated equally, the Court
stated no criteria concerning what constitutes fair play, and what
constitutes an abuse. One careful study of this area suggests that
an abuse will be found, "usually only when the results of retroactive
revocation are very harsh."8 Such an abuse was found in Lesavoy
Foundation v. Commissioner,89 in which the Commissioner retroactively revoked the taxpayer's charitable foundation exemption and
claimed a deficiency which, if collected, would have wiped out the
entire assets of the foundation. The Court refused to condone this
harsh result, holding that the retroactive revocation of the taxpayer's
exemption would constitute an abuse of discretion. Although the
Court did not clearly set forth a rationale for decision, and seemed
to confuse abuse of discretion with estoppel, 90 it was definite on one
point-the result of this retroactive revocation would be too harsh
to allow.91
The legislative history of section 7805(b) indicates that its passage
was intended to authorize the Commissioner "to limit retroactive
application to the extent necessary to avoid inequitable results."92
The predecessor 93 of 7805(b) was enacted because
[i]n some cases the application of regulations, Treasury Decisions, and
rulings to past transactions which have been closed by taxpayers in reliance
upon existing practice, will work such inequitable results that it is believed
desirable to lodge in the Treasury Department the power to avoid these
94
results by applying certain . . . rulings with prospective effect only.

Reasoning with this legislative history in mind, it becomes more
logical to argue that the discretion of the Commissioner is not absolute,
but is limited when considerations of equity are compelling.
This equity is generally strongest in excise tax situations. A retroactive revocation of a favorable excise tax ruling can do serious financial damage to any business, since it might wipe out the entire profit
margin for the years in question. Excise taxes are normally passed
on to the consumer, and any company relieved of taxes would be able
case, it would have been based on discrimination between similar taxpayers rather than
upon the unfairness of the Commissioner's action with regard to the individual.
88. Lynn & Gerson, supra note 81, at 510.
89. 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956).
90. In citing authority for its abuse of discretion argument, the court relied on several
cases which involved estoppel questions. Id. at 592 n.7.
91. Id. at 594.
92. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957)
(emphasis added).
93. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 506, 48 Stat. 757.
94. H. R. lEP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1934).
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to sell or lease at a lower price, creating a serious competitive difference

due to tax administration. Thus, it is not surprising that a second
avenue of taxpayer relief has been opened in several excise tax casesabuse of discretion through discrimination between similarly situated
taxpayers. 95 The Automobile Club holding stressed the importance of

equality in taxation of similarly situated parties, and pointed out that

the Commissioner cannot use his power in a discriminatory manner.96
The success of the taxpayer's charge of discrimination rests upon the
Commissioner's explanation for treating the taxpayer differently from
others in similar situations. If the Court is satisfied that a reasonable

distinction between taxpayers has been established, it will not find
the necessary discrimination.0

Thus, mere discrimination is not

enough; the discrimination must be based upon an arbitrary classification.
In Exchange Parts Co. v. United States,98 the Commissioner revoked
a ruling exempting certain automobile parts from the exicse tax. In

determining the limitation of this revocation, he conditioned prospective effect upon nonpayment of the tax for the previous years in

question, and denied refunds to any who had paid the tax. Thus,
in effect, the revocation had retroactive effect upon anyone who had
paid taxes. The Court of Claims held this classification unreasonable,
stating that "the promptly paying taxpayer could not be validly made
the object of prejudicial discrimination."19 The Commissioner has

been unsuccessful in other cases when attempting to use this classification, 100 and the courts seem quite hesitant to punish the "occasional
95. See International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. CI.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966); Exchange Parts Co. v. United States, 279
F.2d 251 (Ct. Cl. 1960). Contra, Wolinsky v. United States, 271 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.
1959). This concern for the results of retroactive revocation in excise tax situations has
been embodied in statute. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1108(b), 44 Stat. (pt. 2)
114, states: "No tax shall be levied, assessed, or collected under the provisions of Title
VI of this Act on any article sold or leased by the manufacturer .. .if at the time of
the sale or lease there was an existing ruling . . .holding that the sale or lease of such
article was not taxable, and the manufacturer ...parted with possession or ownership
of such article, relying upon the ruling .... ." See also Beaman, How Much Reliance
on a Revenue Ruling? Law Forbids Some Retroactive Revocations, 13 J. TAXATI N 22
(1960). For additional discrimination cases, see Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294
(3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 908 (1960); City Loan & Say. Co. v. United
States, 177 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd, 287 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1961);
Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 907 (Ct. C1. 1956).
96. 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957).
97. For example, in Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959), the taxpayer had never requested a ruling. This was enough to distinguish him from allthose
who had requested rulings; and since he was treated equally with others who had not
requested a ruling, there was no discrimination.
98. 279 F.2d 251 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
99. Id. at 254.
100. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 907 (Ct. CI.
1956). Contra, Wolinsky v. United States, 271 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1959). In Wolinsky,
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unfortunate who happened to pay his taxes on the basis of the law
in the books." 1 1
As a general rule, the cases hold that one taxpayer cannot rely on
a ruling issued to another in order to obtain tax relief. 0 2 The majority
of these cases result in victories for the Commissioner even though the
complaining taxpayer's circumstances may be strikingly similar to
those who have been treated favorably. A typical factual situation
appears in Goodstein v. Commissioner.'°3 The taxpayer was assessed
a deficiency resulting from the disallowance of an interest deduction.
This deduction was based upon an alleged loan which was found to
be lacking in substance and void for tax purposes. The taxpayer,
when deciding to set up this transaction, had relied upon two private
rulings which had been issued to other taxpayers, and which had
assured them favorable tax treatment for similar transactions. The
court clearly believed the taxpayer's plea that he had entered the
transaction in reliance upon the rulings, and did not doubt the fact
14
that he believed in good faith that the transaction was approved. '
However, these facts were of no weight, since the "letters were not
intended to be applicable to the taxpayer"'105 relying upon them. The
court's rationale is fairly simple. It is based primarily upon the impracticability of allowing total freedom of reliance,'10 6 and does not
deal with the possibility of arbitrary discrimination. It is clear, however, that had the question been raised, the court would have found
a reasonable ground for discrimination-distinguishing those taxpayers
with rulings from those without. This same ground was accepted by
the Third Circuit in Weller v. Commissioner0 7 to rebut the taxpayer's
plea of arbitrary discrimination.
We need not determine whether such action if carried out would be an
abuse of discretion, for petitioners are not in the same position as those
the taxpayer paid excise taxes while others similarly situated did not, and gained
knowledge of a favorable private ruling shortly before its revocation. The court held
that this taxpayer was not entitled to a refund, though other taxpayers who had not
paid would not be assessed a deficiency. The court based its holding on lack of
reliance by the taxpayer, and seemed to confuse the ideas of estoppel and discrimination.
101. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 907, 909 (Ct.
Cl. 1956).
102. See Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672 (1962); Bookwalter v.
Brecklein, 357 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1966); Pomeroy Cooperative Grain Co. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1961); Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558
(Ct. Cl. 1965).
103. 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
104. Id. at 132.
105. Id.
106. "But to hold that the Commissioner is bound by rulings specifically addressed
to a taxpayer other than the one whose return is questioned would severely limit the
usefulness of the long established practice of private administrative rulings." Id. at 132.
107. 270 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1959).
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parties who have been issued rulings. They are entitled to the same treat-

ment as all other taxpayers similarly situated, i.e., without rulings, no more
and no less. This the Commissioner has afforded them.108

As a general rule, the taxpayer who bases his claim for relief upon
another taxpayer's ruling has little chance of victory. However, one
0D
recent case, InternationalBusiness Machines Corp. v.United States,
has been cited as an exception to the general rule. In this case
Remington Rand (taxpayer's only competitor in the computer market)
was granted a favorable ruling concerning the excise tax status of a
certain computer. Two months later, IBM requested a ruling on the
same type computer. Then Remington Rand acquired a refund for
the years between 1952 and 1955. IBM also filed for a refund, but
was not successful. In 1957, Remington Rand was notified that its
ruling was to be revoked prospectively beginning in 1958. In 1957,
more than two years after the original request for a ruling, taxpayer
was notified that its machines were taxable. Soon after that, a second
refund claim was disallowed. In effect, the Commissioner was forcing
taxpayer to pay excise taxes on the computer for six years while its
only competitor was free of the same tax on the same type of computer. The Court of Claims held that the Commissioner's refusal to
grant a refund was arbitrary discrimination and an abuse of discretion.
This case is difficult to utilize as authority for the proposition that
the "no-reliance" rule is crumbling, since the facts are so unusual.
First, this was an excise tax situation, and the two taxpayers were the
only competitors in the market. Thus the refusal to aid IBM not only
created an unfair tax burden, but also worked to give Remington Rand
a competitive advantage. Second, IBM had made a good faith attempt
to obtain its own ruling, rather than trying to rely on that of Remington Rand, and the Service could not satisfy the court that there
was any justification for the two-year delay in ruling."0 The court
expanded the meaning of section 7805(b) somewhat, so that it
imposed a clear duty upon the Commissioner to use his best efforts
to avoid inequity: "to consider the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the handing down of a ruling-including the comparative
or differential effect on the other taxpayers in the same class.""'
Some commentary suggested that this case might begin a new trend
in the direction of an equity doctrine used by the courts "as a remedy
108. Id. at 299. For additional cases following this rationale, see Minchin v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1964); Knetsch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932 (Ct.
Cl. 1965); W. Lee MeLane, Jr., 46 T.C. 140 (1966); Arnold A. Schwartz, 40
T.C. 191 (1963).
109. 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. CL 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1966), noted in 64
MicH. L. 11:v. 541 (1966).
110. 343 F.2d at 921-22.
111. Id. at 920.
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for administrative caprice."" 2 It appears, however, that the case has
been limited to its facts by later decisions." 3 This limitation process
would be quite simple for the courts to undertake, since the competitive factors alone would create enough leeway to distinguish IBM
from other cases. One month after the IBM decision, the Court of
Claims decided Bornstein v. United States",4 in which six corporations
joined to build a single apartment building. One of the six obtained
a ruling that a distribution of excess mortgage funds to its shareholders
would receive capital gain treatment. The other five corporations did
not request rulings, since they were all engaged in the same transaction, and the legal counsel who had obtained the ruling represented
all six as a unit. In addition, the Internal Revenue official who had
discussed the ruling with counsel had informed him that the ruling
would be applicable to all six corporations. The Commissioner
assessed deficiencies against the shareholders of the other five corporation and they sued for a refund, arguing arbitrary discrimination
between taxpayers in the same situation. The court held for the
Commissioner, distinguishing IBM by pointing out that IBM had made
timely request for a ruling, and ignoring the other equitable concepts
stated in that case." 5
In 1966, the Eighth Circuit again limited IBM to its facts in the
case of Bookwalter v. Brecklein.16 Taxpayer sued to recover alleged
overpayments of taxes for the year 1957 resulting from a failure to
deduct certain city assessments which a private (though widely publicized) ruling had declared deductible to numerous other taxpayers
in the same situation. The district court ruled for the taxpayer, basing
its holding on the concept that this taxpayer was "entitled as a matter
of law to equality of treatment with.., any others who were accorded
the benefit of the Commissioner's modification provision of no retroactive application of the . . . ruling . . . . ,1 The Eighth Circuit
112. 18 VAm. L. REv. 2069, 2074 (1965).
113. Calechman, Recent Cases Show Need for Caution in Relying on IRS Rulings and
Acquiescences, 23 J. TAxATION 122 (1965); 25 1. TAXATIoN 35 (1966); 24 J. TAXATION
246 (1966).
114. 345 F.2d 558 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
115. The court relegated the IBM case to one footnote, in which it stated: "There
are also controlling factual differences. . . . In that case the court applied section
7805b ... in behalf of a taxpayer who had made prompt application to obtain a private
ruling. . . . In these cases, none of the taxpayers nor corporations in which they are
shareholders asked for rulings." 345 F.2d at 564 n.2. Bornstein may also be distinguished from IBM in that there was no real competitive factor in the former, since the
taxpayers were engaged in the same enterprise. Furthermore, in IBM the taxpayer and
Remington Band were the only two members of the class in question, and received
exactly opposite treatment, while in Bornstein each taxpayer was treated as any other
which had not requested a ruling in the matter. For an excellent analysis of the relationship between IBM and Bornstein, see 18 STAN. L. REv. 736 (1966).
116. 357 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1966).
117. Brecklein v. Bookwalter, 231 F. Supp. 404, 411 (1964).
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reversed this decision, holding that there was no arbitrary discrimination, since taxpayer had been treated the same as all others without
rulings." 8 The court distinguished IBM by pointing out that it
involved a situation where one competitor was being favored unjustly over
the only other competitor in the computer industry. Thus, the only members
of the only logical class therein . . . were being treated in exactly opposite
ways to the great detriment of I.B.M. 119

The above cases indicate that IBM will probably continue to be

limited to its facts. Both involved non-excise tax situations with no
questions of adverse results to the taxpayer beyond the additional
taxation. The courts, in denying relief, do not seem to deny that
equity is on the side of the injured taxpayer; rather they simply allow
administrative practicality to outweigh this consideration. If these
cases had been decided in favor of the taxpayer, the result might have
been a serious slowdown in the ruling program and a flood of reliance
litigation. 2 0 It is probable that the courts are correct in taking this
conservative view of the reliance problem. Assuming that taxpayers
were allowed to rely freely upon another taxpayer's private ruling, it
would in all likelihood:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Reduce the Service's willingness to rule,
Increase the time involved in obtaining a ruling,
Render obsolete the statutory closing agreement, and
Cause every ruling to be subjected to121intensive review at the highest
levels of the Service before issuance.

If these results did occur, the whole policy and purpose of the rulings
program would be frustrated. Instead of a 60 to 90 day wait, the
taxpayer might well have to delay a transaction six months or longer
while waiting for his request to be reviewed by ranking Service
officials. In addition, the Service would be most hesitant to rule at all
on any point which indicated even the slightest danger to the revenue,
since through publication the ruling might be binding in thousands
of cases. As the Commissioner points out:
Today, if an error is made in a given case, the revenue is not likely to be
jeopardized to any great extent. On the other hand, if an erroneous interpretation in one case would be binding in all comparable cases, the Service
quite naturally would be more hesitant in exercising its discretionary authority to rule on close questions.' 22
118. 357 F.2d at 82.
119. Id. at 84.
120. "We would not he remiss to point out that a favorable ruling.... herein would
Not allowing the Commissioner some
open the proverbial floodgates of litigation ....
proper discretion in prospectively or retroactively revoking private rulings would cause
the elimination of private letter rulings and any and all benefits to be derived therefrom."
Id. at 85.
121. Caplin, supra note 17 at 26-29.
122. Id. at 27.

1967]

99

NOTES

The courts must take a somewhat conservative position then, in an
effort to preserve the flexibility that is so important to the proper
functioning of the rulings program. However, it is obvious that in
certain instances the Commissioner-due to negligence or to an overzealous desire to protect the revenue-will overstep his bounds. If
this happens, the courts must be willing to protect the injured taxpayer
by finding an abuse of those discretionary powers which the Commissioner has been granted. This is particularly necessary in any
situation in which the taxpayer, due to some act or omission by the
Service, has suffered an injury beyond mere additional taxation. It is
hoped that the IBM rationale can be used to protect taxpayers whenever their competitive position has been damaged through discriminatory actions by the Service.
SAUL C. BELz

